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PRE-TRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
P. Raymond Lamonica*
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The Attempt to Stop
State v. Saia' is a significant case in the developing standards regulating police encounters with individuals under
circumstances where there is less than probable cause to
arrest. Justice Dixon, speaking for the 4-3 majority, announced, "[t]he 'right to be let alone,' as Justice Brandeis
phrased it, is of utmost importance in a free society. The
police cannot interfere with the right unless specifically authorized by a judicial officer or under a narrowly drawn exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend2
ment."
In cases of "seizures" of the person not reaching the level
of arrest, the Fourth Amendment "unreasonable" seizure
proscription rather than probable cause has been adopted.3
Saia's import is that the court approaches the question of
unreasonable governmental action in police encounter situations based upon the proposition that individuals have a
"right to be let alone." In so doing, the decision does not rely
strictly upon a fourth amendment "seizure" determination,
but rather the prefatory language asserting "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons . . . ." Thus, the
finding of a "seizure" of the person, as was found in Terry v.
Ohio4 does not appear critical.
In Saia, the arresting officers were driving slowly past a
residence that they "knew" from reports was an outlet for
drugs. The defendant appeared to have just left the residence
and was walking down the sidewalk. As the marked police car
slowly followed her, she put her hand in the waistband of her
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 302 So. 2d 869 (La. 1974).
2. Id. at 873.
3. Sibron v. N.Y., 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See
U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized"; LA. C. CRIM. P. art.
215.1.
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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blue jeans, turned around and walked back toward the residence at a normal pace. After she turned around, the officers
"sprang" from their car to overtake her. One officer testified
that as he approached the defendant, he saw her take what
he thought to be a glassine envelope containing heroin out of
her trousers and raise her hand to her mouth. The officers
then grabbed the defendant and placed her in custody.
The critical constitutional question is determining at
what point governmental interference occurred. Reading the
"right to be let alone" language literally, perhaps the officers
had no right to observe the defendant as she walked by following her slowly in the car. The decision does suggest that,
but notes that "the seizure . . . occurred when the police
officers sprang from their car and overtook the defendant
....
The court did not consider the actions of the police in
simply observing the defendant a governmental intrusion.8
Some of the lack of clarity in the decision results from an
attempt to determine when a "seizure" or stop took place. If
the overtaking of the defendant was the first governmental
intrusion, the majority position is difficult to sustain due to
the intervening observation of the glassine envelope. 7 The
import of the majority position, read in its entirety, is that
the governmental intrusion took place when the officers
exited the car with the intent of overtaking the defendant.
Justice Dixon makes that clear, "[t]he police cannot approach
citizens under circumstances that make it seem that some
form of detention is imminent unless they have probable
cause to arrest the individual or reasonable grounds to detain
the individual under Terry v. Ohio.... "8 The language indicates that a police officer cannot evidence an intent to stop an
individual unless he has grounds to effect the stop.
This aspect of the decision is not as novel as it might first
appear. In State v. Lawson 9 the court, without reference to
constitutional standards, recognized that when officers illegally stopped a person, causing that person to either abandon
"-

5. 302 So. 2d at 873.
6. Justice Summers in dissent notes, "I cannot subscribe to the finding
that a stop occurred here by merely driving alongside the defendant." Id. at
876. "In my view no stop occurred until the officer actually laid hands upon
her and detained her, announcing that she was arrested." Id. at 877.
7. Id. at 874 (Sanders, C.J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 873 (emphasis added).
9. 256 La. 471, 236 So. 2d 804 (1970). See also State v. Reed, 284 So. 2d 574
(La. 1973).
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or accidentally drop contraband, the contraband, being a
product of an illegal stop, could not be admitted as evidence.
If in Lawson the contraband would have been discarded or
abandoned prior to the actual physical stopping-during the
attempt to stop-it is doubtful that the results would have
differed. Courts have recognized that in "abandoned" property cases when property is abandoned because of illegal
police activity prior to the actual arrest, the property is
tainted and inadmissible.' 0
Finding a constitutionally protected interest under the
fourth amendment, the court must then determine whether a
stop would have been justified or reasonable. Saia does not
purport to change the standard applied in effecting a stop and
it has not been applied to do so."' Terry posits the standard
for reviewing the actions of police officers in actual seizures
of the person less than an arrest in that the officer must point
to specific and articulable facts enabling him "to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot. .. 12 and "the facts available at the moment of the
seizure must 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that the action taken was appropriate'. ."..",13
Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion, which, as Justice Dixon notes,
14
the United States Supreme Court now apparently accepts,
states that to justify a "stop" the police officer "must first
have a right not to avoid him [defendant] but to be in his
presence. That right must be more than the liberty .. .to
address questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person
addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and
5
walk away."'
10. See, e.g., Capitoli v. Wainwright, 426 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1970); Fletcher
v. Wainwright, 399 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1968). Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).
11. See, e.g., State v. Truss, 317 So. 2d 177 (La. 1975); State v. La Garde,
311 So. 2d 890 (La. 1975); State v. Scott, 307 So. 2d 291 (La. 1975).
12. 392 U.S. at 21.
13. Id. at 30.
14. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
15. 392 U.S. at 17. The majority opinion in Terry is instructive also as to
the standards applicable in determining whether there is a fourth amendment seizure. "Obviously not all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer by means of
physical force or show of authority has some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen may we conclude a 'seizure' has occurred" (emphasis added). Id. at 19
n.16.
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Applying these standards to the attempt to stop, when
the officers sprang from the car with the apparent intent to
stop Miss Saia, insufficient grounds existed to justify a legal
stop. The only facts available to the officers upon exiting the
car were that the defendant appeared to be leaving a house
reputedly used as a drug outlet, and that, upon seeing the
police, she put her hand into her waistband and walked in the
direction from which she came.
Disagreement over whether those facts would support a
stop would not be unreasonable. 16 The dissenting opinions,
however, appear to find probable cause to arrest because of
the defendant's actions after the officers left the car. There is
little doubt that these actions did constitute probable cause to
arrest. The difficulty with the dissents' rationale is that the
defendant's actions appear to have been impelled by the unauthorized actions of the police officers, who evinced an intent to effect an unjustified stop or arrest. The inquiry must
be directed to determining if when the officers reasonably led
the defendant to believe a stop was imminent, there were
grounds to effect a stop.
If evidence is obtained during the unauthorized attempt,
it is inadmissible at trial and cannot support probable cause.
In the actual stop situation, Terry recognized that on the
street police-citizen encounters must be limited to the "legitimate investigative sphere" and adopted the "taint-fruit" rationale. 17 The prior "fruit of illegal stop" decisions have involved effected stops rather than, as in Saia, an attempt to
stop. The rationale should not differ. There can be no meaningful constitutional distinction between completed seizures
of the person by way of unreasonable stops or arrests and
other police activity, short of stops or arrests. The latter, just
as completed stops or arrests, might reasonably cause an
individual to act in such a manner as to produce evidence.
16. See, e.g., State v. Finklea, 313 So. 2d 224 (La. 1975); State v. Jefferson,
284 So. 2d 882 (La. 1973); State v. Winesberry, 256 La. 532, 237 So. 2d 364
(1970).
17. 392 U.S. at 15. "Nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating
approval of police conduct outside th6 legitimate investigative sphere ....

Courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police
conduct which is overbearing or harassing,or which trenches upon personal
security without the objective evidentiary- justification which the Constitution requires. When such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the
judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evidence ....
Id. (emphasis
added).
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That evidence is tainted as a fruit of the illegal police activity.
To conclude otherwise is to let the police accomplish indirectly what they could not directly. Of course, there will be as
in abandoned property cases, 18 situations in which the defendant did not reasonably believe that detention or a stop was
imminent. It is necessary to consider all relevant circumstances existing at the time of the police-individual encounter.
As a matter of trial practice, this case highlights a significant factual consideration. In an "attempt to stop" situation, facts reflecting the "circumstances that make it seem
that some form of detention is imminent"' 9 must be carefully
developed by counsel and examined by the court. In this respect, the record in Saia appears to be less than fully developed. Further testimony on the nature of the approach by
the police officers, indicating whether their actions or subjective intent at that time would have led a reasonable person to
conclude that the defendant would be stopped or arrested
rather than merely asked for a voluntary identification,
would have been helpful. In light of the nature of street
encounters and their "low visibility" in the criminal justice
system, courts should look critically at subjective testimony
indicating that there was only an intent to ask for voluntary
identification.
Search Warrants
Unidentified Informants
The Louisiana Supreme Court has again had to delineate
the constitutional standards by which to test the sufficiency
of a supporting affidavit for a search warrant relying upon
information supplied by an informant. Last term in State v.
Paciera20 Justice Tate extensively discussed the constitutional considerations. Perhaps because of the close nature of
the case, the complex combination of hearsay and personal
observation and the continuing nature of the criminal activity, Pacieralacks the clarity desired in delineating the appropriate standards for analyzing supporting affidavits that rely
upon informants. In light of the number of times Pacierahas
18. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); United States v.
Manning, 440 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1971).
19. 302 So. 2d at 873.
20. 290 So. 2d 681 (La. 1974).
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been cited already, 21 it is becoming the leading informantprobable cause case in Louisiana. This term in State v. Humble, 22 the majority quotes the language of Paciera that the
"underlying circumstances" or facts must be
...sufficient to provide a substantial factual basis by
which the magistrate might find RELIABLE both the
INFORMANT and the INFORMATION given by him.
Factors which support the CREDIBILITY of an unidentified informant include ....

Factors which support the

CREDITABILITY (sic) of the information reported include .... 23
This test is unnecessarily obscure. The shorthand word
formula may obfuscate the real considerations. The less than
strict use of such terms as "reliability" and "credibility" as
shorthand references to distinct considerations leads to confusion. In addition, some of the confusion results from the use
of these terms by the affiants themselves. Since determining
probable cause based upon information supplied by an informant is not a simple task, that judgmental difficulty should
not be compounded by ambiguity in the basic conceptual
framework.
When an informant is not involved, the scheme of analysis is rather straightforward: the affiant either observes criminal activity or'observes circumstances which would lead a
reasonable person to infer criminal activity. The affiant is
identified and made known to the magistrate.
In both the case of the affiant's personal observations and
that when he relies upon an informant the magistrate, not
the affiant, makes the determination of probable cause based
upon facts, not conclusions, set forth in the affidavit. 24 When
the affiant obtains information from an informant, that information is hearsay and subjected to stricter restraints.
When the magistrate is presented with hearsay, he must be
21. State v. Vince, 305 So. 2d 916 (La. 1974); State v. Boudreaux, 304 So. 2d
343 (La. 1974); State v. Jackson, 301 So. 2d 598 (La. 1974); State v. Devall, 296
So. 2d 802 (La. 1974). See also The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courtsfor
the 1978-1974 Term-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 35 LA. L. REV. 461, 475
(1975).
22. 309 So. 2d 138 (La. 1975).
23. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
24. See, e.g., Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); State v.
Wells, 253 La. 925, 221 So. 2d 50 (1969); State v. Holmes, 254 La. 501, 225 So. 2d
1 (1969).
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provided with a factual basis for crediting the hearsay information. Aguillar v. Texas 25 first set forth the criterion and
although its application has seemingly become more flexible
27
in Spinelli v. United States26 and United States v. Harris, it
has not been repudiated. Aguillar requires, as a mechanism
for crediting hearsay, first, that the affiant articulate the
basis for his belief that the informant is trustworthy and
second, that the affidavit indicate the method by which the
informer obtained the information. The latter requirement
seeks to eliminate the possibility that the informant is relying
on mere rumor, the former to reduce the possibility that the
information is no more than an elaborate fabrication.
Unfortunately there is language in the leading decisions
which provokes shorthand analysis of the above considerations by talking in terms of "underlying circumstances," "reliable" or "credible" informants and "reliable" or "credible"
information. When an informant is relied upon, the magistrate must be given facts indicating that the informant is a
trustworthy individual plus facts indicating the manner in
which the informant obtained his information. The two aspects should be considered separately in light of their individual and separate purposes. Facts indicating trustworthiness of the informant are typically prior dealings indicating
accurate information or the personal corroboration of current
information given. Facts reflecting that the information was
obtained in a reliable manner are, at best, personal observations by the informant. However, hearsay (double hearsay to
the affiant) may also meet the reliability in obtaining information requirement. In such circumstances it appears that
the test applied to the initial informant should be reapplied if
one is not to allow an informant to "boot strap" himself into
2
the reliability requirement.
In Humble the affidavit clearly failed to set forth the
manner in which the information was obtained. 29 One dissent
25. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
26. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
27. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
28. Justice Tate noted in Paciera:"If the information came indirectly to
the informant, [the affidavit must set forth] the reasons in sufficient factual
detail for the magistrate to evaluate and credit the reliability [and credibility] both of the indirect source and of the indirectly-obtainedinformation."
290 So. 2d at 686 (emphasis added).
29. "The informer says he [Humble] sells marijuana out of his car to
teenagers around Jonesville, La. Steve Humble has been suspected of using
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asserts that from the detailed facts provided in the affidavit
"[i]t is reasonably to be inferred, if not implicit, from an
affirmative statement giving these detailed facts and information, when not qualified as in this case, that the statement
is made from the informer's personal knowledge." 3 0 The informant's mere statement of fact is not sufficient to allow the
inference of personal knowledge in that there is an absence of
sufficient detail to show that he "is relying on something
more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's
general reputation." 3 1
The most serious difficulty with the dissenting opinions is
their willingness to assume that, if the affidavit demonstrates
a trustworthy informant, the information given must have
been obtained in a reliable manner. Justice Summers states:
[W]hen considered with the other specific circumstances
recited here, this affidavit of veracity and indicia of
trustworthiness should be considered by the magistrate in
this determination of [the informant's] reliability and
32
truthfulness.
Such rationale is directly contrary to the Aguillar-Spinelli rule and should be rejected. If accepted, the informer
must only have given accurate information previously to
raise a presumption that he reliably obtained information in
the present case. Such a position would vitiate the limited
protections 33 already existing in the informant situation.
While the courts have long held that a credible, identified
person must state the manner in which he obtained his information,3 the dissents seem to be willing to allow an unidentified person to do less, i.e., establish only his credibility.
"Staleness" was an additional ground for invalidating the
warrant in Humble. The court noted that the affidavit did
not present sufficient information from which the court could
and distributing marijuana for a year or more. The undersigned has received
reports from various sources, other than the reliable informant, referred to
above, that Steve Humble has possessed and used marijuana." 309 So. 2d at
139.
30. Id. at 142.
31. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
32. 309 So. 2d at 142.
33. See Rebel, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A
Search for Meaningful Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703 (1972).
34. See cases noted in note 24, supra.
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infer that the probable cause information was "recent
enough. '35 The court recognized the constitutional requirement that a finding of probable cause for a search warrant,
unlike an arrest warrant, must include a finding that the
facts set forth in the affidavit are closely related in time to
justify a reasonable belief that conditions supporting probable cause to search still exist, i.e., that the things sought are
still at the place to be searched.
Earlier in the term, in State v. Boudreaux,3 6 the court
held that if a common sense reading of the affidavit indicates
that the information contained in it is current, the affidavit is
adequate. The peculiar facts of Boudreaux indicating that the
defendant was only "temporarily" 37 in the dormitory might
justify that conclusion, but in light of the purpose of search
warrants and the requirement of probable cause to believe
the items sought are still at the place to be searched, liberal
inferences are inappropriate.u
Known Informants
The determination of trustworthiness of a known informant was at issue in State v. Devall.39 The named informant had admitted participation in a robbery-murder. A
search warrant was issued authorizing search of defendant's
apartment for weapons used in the crime. The weapons found
did not match those listed on the warrant. A second warrant
was issued, based upon information from the same known
informant, authorizing search of the same apartment for
opium. The second search was successful.
Defendants challenged the second warrant on the
grounds that the informer was not trustworthy, but the court
found otherwise. 40 Since the informant stated that he actu35. 309 So. 2d at 140.
36. 304 So. 2d 343 (La. 1974).
37. Id. The "temporary" nature of the dormitory stay was inferred from
the fact that the affidavit stated the regular dormitory room was not being
used because of a malfunctioning air conditioner. Id.
38. See Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on
the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664 (1961). See also United States
v. Harruff, 352 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Dean v. State, 46 Ala. App. 365,
242 So. 2d 411 (1970); People v. Wright, 367 Mich. 611, 116 N.W.2d 756 (1963).
39. 296 So. 2d 803 (La. 1974).
40. "Here, the informant is named and he gives a detailed factual basis
for the reliability of the information concerning the opium. Thus, the search
warrant and the affidavit does not offend Fourth Amendment standards. . .
Id. at 804.
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ally had seen the opium at a recent date and had smoked
some of it, there was no problem with respect to the reliability
of the manner in which the information was obtained. The
sole issue was the trustworthiness of the known informer.
The fact that he had made incriminating admissions, that
prior information had been partially corroborated and partially found to be erroneous and that he was named in the
affidavit are all probative of his credibility. In Paciera, the
court noted, "[wie are influenced to some extent by the circumstances that affiant specifically named the reliable informants (the policemen) ... ."41 Unfortunately the court did not
take the opportunity in this unique case to provide guidance
with respect to factors relating to the trustworthiness of
known informants. From the opinion one might infer that the
mere naming of an informant is sufficient to establish credibility, or that credibility is not a consideration when the in42
formant is known.
The Husband Poisoning Exception?
State v. Flood43 demonstrates that the determination of
the existence of probable cause is less than totally predictable
even when a search warrant is not based on information
supplied by informants. Mrs. Flood was accused of murdering
her husband by poisoning him with arsenic. The search warrant recited that her husband had died of acute pulmonary
edema, that a laboratory test indicated high concentrations of
arsenic in the body organs and blood of the decedent, that
after extensive investigation by the Houma police department and the Terrebonne Parish sheriffs office an affidavit
was filed against Mrs. Flood charging her with murder, and
that the affiant police officer had "reasonable grounds and
probable cause" to believe that there was arsenic concealed in
the mobile home.
Justice Dixon correctly noted in dissent 44 that under the
most flexible tests of probable cause, these recitations did not
41. 290 So. 2d at 686.
42. In United States v. Darenbourg,520 F.2d 985 (5th ir. 1975), the court
appears to accept such a position and even casts doubt on Aguillar-Spinelli
requirements by distinguishing between "professional" and "nonprofessional" informants. See also United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.
1975).
43. 301 So. 2d 637 (La. 1974).
44. Id. at 652 (Dixon, J., dissenting).

1976] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1974-1975

585

constitute probable cause to believe that the evidence sought,
"all or part of chemical substances containing arsenic," was
on the premises. The murder had taken place some eightythree days prior to the search. Moreover, the affidavit failed
to set forth facts, rather than the officers' conclusion, supporting probable cause. The case might be characterized as
the "husband poisoning" exception to the normal probable
cause requirements. The court was apparently willing to assume that married men poisoned by arsenic are probably
poisoned by their wives, with the poison kept in the house.
"We must bear in mind that this is a prosecution of a wife for
45
the murder of her husband by arsenic poisoning."
Searches Involving Automobiles
The automobile continues to play a large role in the development and application of search and seizure principles. In
State v. Navarro4 6 the defendant was stopped after running a
stop sign.47 The officers ordered the occupants out of the car
and asked the driver and passenger for identification. One
officer walked over to the automobile and focused his flashlight inside the vehicle. He observed gleanings and seeds
which he believed to be marijuana. He then seized the material and arrested the two occupants. After formal arrest the
officer again focused his flashlight and saw a plastic bag
above the driver's sun visor. Upon examining its contents, he
determined it contained marijuana. The officer then inquired
whether the defendant and his companion had anything else.
The companion produced marijuana that was concealed in his
underwear.
Three packages of evidence were admitted over objection:
the seeds which were the "gleanings" observed on the passenger seat, a clear plastic bag containing marijuana and
packages of cigarette paper, and loose marijuana in an evidence bag. The record did not reflect which of the latter two
were in the visor or in the companion's underwear. Justice
Barham determined that the seeds initially seized were law45. Id. at 642.
46. 312 So. 2d 848 (La. 1975).
47. Here there was no question of the legality of the initial stopping.
While the determination of justification for stops based upon "articulable
facts" has been dealt with in numerous cases, there still remains the question of whether a stop can be effected for regulatory purposes such as
drivers' license checks purportedly authorized by LA. R.S. 32:411(d) (1950).
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 n.8 (1975).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

fully seized pursuant to a traditional application of the "plain

view" exception. 4 From that point on, however, the decision
introduces new and questionable treatment of search and
seizure.
The record reflected that the crime lab report indicated
that the seeds were incapable of germination and thus did not
fit within the statutory definition of marijuana. The court
then correctly stated, "the trial court erred when it was
shown that the crime laboratory could not identify them as
marijuana. '49 However, under statutory and prior case law,
this was not a proper case for the suppression of evidence.
Article 703 is posited in terms of unconstitutionally seized
evidence. Since the evidence was constitutionally seized, it
should not have been suppressed. The court had previously
concluded that while "[a] motion may be used to suppress
evidence taken by means of unconstitutional search and seizure . . . our procedure does not authorize the use of the

Motion to Suppress to test the admissibility of evidence constitutionally seized." 5 0 That admissibility question is one of
relevancy and should be raised simply by a contemporaneous
objection.
The defendant should assure appellate examination of
the entire record and create an opportunity for a verdict of
acquittal, rather than reversal and remand, by moving for a
directed verdict.5 1 His failure to move for a directed verdict

would preclude review of the sufficiency of evidence. 52 If the
defendant is unsuccessful on appeal, his only other course of
relief would be through collateral proceedings based upon due
process considerations. It now appears well-settled that a
conviction based upon a record lacking any relevant and ad48. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Marshall v.
United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970).
49. 312 So. 2d at 850.
50. State v. Garnier, 261 La. 802, 806, 261 So. 2d 221, 223 (La. 1972).
51. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 778, 851; State v. Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485
(La. 1973).
52. In light of La. Acts 1975, No. 527, which purports to limit the directed
verdict to bench trials, State v. Dimopou~as, 260 La. 874, 257 So. 2d 644 (1972),
is significant: "In absence of a motion for a directed verdict, how is the
question of no evidence to be raised and preserved for review? Grounds for a
new trial do not include no evidence. The motion in this case tracked provisions of LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 851, and arleged that the verdict is contrary to
the law and the evidence. This court has repeatedly held that this presents
nothing for review in a motion for a new trial ......

supra, at 647 n.1.

State v. Dimopoullas,
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missible evidence as to a critical element of the offense
53
charged violates due process.
With respect to the remaining two packages of evidence
the court concluded that the marijuana from the companion's
underwear could not form the basis for the defendant's prosecution since the state did not establish defendant's actual or
constructive possession of or control over it. It could not,
therefore, be introduced at trial. The court's conclusion again
involved review of sufficiency of evidence rather than constitutional considerations and should have been treated similarly.
Particularly noteworthy is the court's application of State
v. Meiche154 to the plastic bag seizure. In Meichel, the court
stated "[a]n object in open plain view may be seized only
where it is readily apparent that the object is contraband or
evidence .... -55 Applying Meichel, the court determined "the
plastic bag . . . was not clearly contraband since many legal
items are contained in plastic bags." 56 The opinion does not
consider whether the prior proper observation of sterilized
marijuana seeds would support a reasonable conclusion that
the plastic bag was other than a plastic bag which might
contain "many legal items." But the prior finding of marijuana seeds followed by the sighting of a plastic bag might
present a different situation than that contemplated in
Meichel, in which there was no prior observation of what
could reasonably have been contraband.
After rejecting the "plain view" contentions as to the
plastic bag seizure, the court considered the automobile exception 57 to determine whether the search of the car without
a search warrant was permissible. Justice Barham stated a
stringent standard in determining whether exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless search of an automobile.
53. See Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974); Harris v. United
States, 404 U.S. 1232 (1971); Garner v. Lousiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1951).
54. 290 So.2d 878 (La. 1974).
55. Id. at 880.
56. 312 So. 2d at 850-51. See also State v. Herron, 321 So. 2d 312 (La. 1975).
57. This writer suggests that some of the confusion resulting in automobile cases is created by considering the automobile as an "exception" to
normal search and seizure considerations. The fact of the automobile and its
mobility in each individual case is simply a set of circumstances indicating
whether there is an exigent situation eliminating the need for a search
warrant when there is probable cause. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971).
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He recognized that the officers were "obligated" 5 to protect
the vehicle for the arrestees, but suggested that protection
would entail only locking the automobile or placing it in a
garage. 59 The opinion rejects the contention that an immediate search of the auto was necessary to protect evidence
from being destroyed or secreted.6 0 Justice Tate was apparently unwilling, correctly it is submitted, to find that there
was probable cause to search a car simply because an officer
found gleanings that resembled marijuana on the seat. Justice Tate's concurrence indicates an unwillingness to extend
61
searches incident to traffic arrests.
Justice Marcus in dissent suggests that the rationale of
United States v. Robinson6 2 and Gustafson v. Florida63 should
be extended to a search of an automobile as well as of the
arrestee's person incident to a full custodial arrest. That position would make the fourth amendment meaningless with
respect to automobiles and expand the definition of "incident"
to arrest drastically. While it is suggested that ".... a search
of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected
by the fourth amendment than the search of one's person
• . . ,"64 that same contention can be made with respect to
houses and offices. Certainly a search of the person is the
most intrusive; that conclusion should not render the fourth
amendment meaningless as to "houses," "papers" and "effects."
In State v. Thomas6 5 the defendant was arrested at a
service station three blocks from the police station. Approaching the defendant's vehicle, the officers instructed the defendant and a companion to get out of the car. No search took
place at that time. One officer drove the vehicle to the police
station, parked it and left it unattended. After entering the
58. 312 So. 2d at 851, citing United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.
1970).
59. 312 So. 2d at 851.
60. Id. at 852. See State v. Massey, 310 So. 2d 557 (La. 1975).
61. "An American's vehicle, if not his castle, is an important component
of his daily life in the mobile America of this day. A traffic offense does not
end, for an American driver, the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the
freedom of his effects from state rummaging by warrantless search." 312 So.
2d at 855.
62. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
63. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
64. 312 So. 2d at 854.
65. 310 So. 2d 517 (La. 1975).
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station, one of the officers recalled that Thomas, when initially approached, had leaned forward as if to put something
under the seat. Ten to fifteen minutes later he and another
officer opened the unlocked car door and "immediately saw a
pistol on the floorboard protruding from under the rear of the
66
front seat."
The court correctly concluded that the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle. The only question was
whether a search warrant was required. The decision lacks
clarity not because of the result, but because of the ambiguity
as to the legal basis for reaching the result and the introduction of extraneous considerations. While recognizing the confusing state of the law,6 7 the decision appears to unnecessarily add to it.
The opinion suggests that the search of the car might fit
within the United States v. Edwards6 8 exception, which includes searches when "the normal processes incident to arrest and custody [are] still in progress."6 9 It further indicates
that the "incident to arrest" rationale based upon selfprotection and prevention of destruction of evidence was relevant, without explaining how. 70 The court finally states that
"certain exceptional circumstances-the limited 'search,' the
inherent probable cause for search for weapons or evidence a
(sic) vehicle occupied by those reasonably suspected of recent
robbery-murders-have led us to believe the present search
and seizure not constitutionally infirm .... -71
The leading automobile search cases, Chambers v. Maroney 72 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire,73 can present a basis
for deciding cases like Thomas without introducing new considerations. In footnote 20, Coolidge sets forth the United
States Supreme Court's understanding of Chambers:
66. Id. at 520.
67. "Nevertheless, but with some difficulty, we believe the present to
concern a distinguishable situation in this shifting 'quagmire' area of constitutional interpretation . . . . With some diffidence, we suggest that the
present warrantless search did not violate the constitutional prohibitions...."
Id. at 520. "We freely admit our decision is reconcilable with some but not
other decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this shifting and
uncertain area of law." Id. at 522.
68. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
69. 310 So. 2d at 521, citing 415 U.S. 300.
70. 310 So. 2d at 520.
71. Id. at 521-22.
72. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
73. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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The rationale of Chambers is that given a justified initial
intrusion there is little difference between a search on
the open highway and a later search at the station. Here
we deal with the prior question of whether the initial
74
intrusion is justified.
75
The Court also reconciled Cooper v. California:

In Cooper, the seizure of the petitioner's car was mandated by California's statute, and its legality was not
questioned. The case stands for the proposition that given
an unquestionably legal seizure, there are special circumstances that may validate a subsequent warrantless
search.... The case certainly should not be read as holding
that the police can do without a warrant at the police
station what they are forbidden to do without a warrantat
76
the place of seizure.
If the court had found the initial intrusion justified, the
search in Thomas could be constitutionally justified. The
analysis therefore should be directed toward considerations
relevant to allowing the initial intrusion, i.e., the existence of
"exigent circumstances." While that determination is neither
always straightforward nor easy, attention to that central
consideration avoids introduction of extraneous issues and
allows a more rational scheme of analysis in light of the
peculiar facts of each case. When the police have the opportunity to drive a car to the police station, as in Thomas,
sufficient exigent circumstances to allow a warrantless
search based upon probable cause should not ordinarily exist.
Law Officer Credibility and Search & Seizure: A Note
Readers of opinions sometimes speculate that courts appear to "make law" to avoid challenging the credibility of law
enforcement officers, even when the record casts considerable
doubt upon that credibility. 7 7 Especially in marijuana possession cases, much apparent confusion and inconsistency in
legal principles and the expansion of these principles has
74. Id. at 463 n.20.
75. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
76. 403 U.S. at 464 n.21.
77. See, e.g., State v. Navarro, 312 So. 2d 848 (La. 1975); State v. Saia, 302
So. 2d 869 (La. 1974); State v. Hargiss, 288 So. 2d 663 (La. 1974); State v.
Lawson, 256 La. 471, 236 So. 2d 804 (1970).
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resulted from courts' unwillingness to directly challenge the
credibility of law enforcement officers. In State v. Jones, 78 the
4-3 majority directly addressed the officer credibility problem.
The primary issue was whether there were grounds to stop
the defendant for a traffic violation when one officer admitted
that they intended to stop the driver because he had just left
a house under surveillance for drug activity. When they
stopped the defendant, the now common scenario of finding
marijuana gleanings in "plain view" took place. Justice
Barham noted, "After careful review of the testimony taken
at the hearing . . .we find that substantial portions of the
officer's testimony was basically contradictory, highly incredible, and wholly unworthy of belief." 7 9 He concluded that the
supreme court is "required" to review "judge questions" of
law and fact and to reverse when the court finds that the trial
court has abused its discretion with respect to witness credibility80
On the same day, Justice Tate, writing for the court, in
refusing to reverse based on credibility, with only Justice
Barham concurring and no dissents, set forth what he deemed
to be the standard of review:
. . .we are unable to say that the trial court's factual
determination was so clearly erroneous as to justify disturbing it on appeal. The versions of the police officers are
not so completely improbable as to justify our substitution
of our evaluation of these police witnesses' credibility for
that made by the trial court to which great weight must
be given.8 1
Article V, § 5(c) of the Louisiana Constitution limits the
appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court in criminal cases
to questions of law. In neither Jones nor Santos did the majority deem that this proscription prevented the court from
reviewing the facts presented at a suppression hearing to
determine if the trial court's factual determination was
78. 308 So. 2d 790 (La. 1975).
79. Id. at 792.
80. In Jones, if the supreme court had been unwilling to directly attack
the credibility problem, upon a proper record made by defense counsel, it is

unlikely it would have allowed the conviction to stand, as it should not.
Instead, there would probably be an attempt to apply "law" to distorted or
false facts in such a manner as to achieve a "just" result. That "law" probably would have been less than conceptually satisfactory.
81. State v. Santos, 309 So. 2d 129 (La. 1975) (emphasis added).
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"clearly erroneous" or exceeded the bounds of discretion. The
constitutional prohibition against review of facts should not
prevent the supreme court from reviewing testimony related
to constitutional rights with an appropriate standard of review. 82 The motion to suppress is unrelated to the issue of
guilt and is tried to the judge alone.
As the court noted, the primary responsibility for assessing credibility lies with the trial courts. Aside from articulating the standard of review, however, the supreme court has
given little or no guidance to trial courts to assist in determinations of credibility of law enforcement officers' testimony in
support of an exception to the search warrant requirement.
Some of the difficulty in this area relates to burden of proof.
Article 703(C) provides that in a motion to suppress "the
burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the grounds of
his motion . . . ." In warrantless search cases, the defendant
must go forward with evidence, but the burden is met by
showing that there was (1) no warrant and (2) a seizure. To
conclude otherwise is to vitiate constitutional standards, as
indicated in Chimel v. California, 3 quoting United States v.
Jeffers:
Clearly the general requirement that a search warrant be
obtained is not lightly to be dispensed with and "the burden is on those seeking [an] exemption [from the requirement] to show the need for it ....
84
In light of the constitutional standard, trial courts must
carefully scrutinize law officers' testimony in warrantless
search and seizure cases. If an officer's testimony seems improbable in light of common human experience, it should be
rejected. 85 Any independent contradiction of the officer's tes82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(a) (supervisory jurisdiction); Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963); State v. Lawson, 256
La. 471, 236 So. 2d 804 (1970); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 374 (3d ed. 1969). In State v. Monroe, 305 So. 2d 902 (La. 1974), Justice Summers in dissent does not question the court's authority
to review credibility
related facts. "The issue of voluntariness is a question of fact involving to a
large extent, as in this case, the credibility of witnesses." State v. Monroe,
supra, at 904.
83. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
84. 395 U.S. at 762.
85. In consent cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted a "clear
and convincing evidence" standard. See State v. Amphy, 259 La. 161, 249 So.
2d 560 (1971). There is no reason why this same standard should not apply in
other warrant exceptions.
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timony or independent corroboration of the defendant's testimony should prevail because of the stringent constitutional
standard. 8 While the suggested general standards do not
make determinations of credibility mechanical or always
easy, Justice Frankfurter's admonition is appropriate:
"[T]here comes a point where the Court should not be igno87
rant as judges of what we know as men."
PRETRIAL ACCESS TO PROSECUTOR'S EVIDENCE

Pretrial access to oral inculpatory statements is a longstanding problem.8 8 Article 703 limits the motion to suppress
to "written confession(s) or written inculpatory statement(s)."8' 9 The Louisiana Supreme Court has previously relaxed the writing requirement to include video92taped state9
ments,90 audio taped statements ' and line-ups.
The decisions this term reflect a continued refusal to
relax the writing requirement by review on appeal and that,
at the pre-conviction stage, the court is willing to order production and examination of oral statements. There is also an
indication that in the future oral statements may be consid86. This tentatively suggested standard is adapted from People v.
McMurty, 64 Misc. 2d 63, 314 N.Y.S. 2d 194 (Crim. Ct. of City of N.Y. 1970). See
Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotic "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap,
60 GEORGETOWN L. REV. 507 (1971). By discussing only law officer credibility
problems, it is not suggested that the fault lies solely with the law enforcement officer. There are many factors which give rise to the problem, including lack of training, training which does not lend toward belief in the spirit of
the constitutional standards, competition for advancement based upon convictions, improper prosecutor supervision, failure of the trial courts to explain their rulings to the officers, etc. See also, Grano, A Dilemma for Defense
Counsel: Spinelli-HarrisSearch Warrant, and the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 UNIV. OF ILL. LAW FOR. 405; LaFave & Remington, Controlling the
Police: The Judge's Role in Making & Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions,
63 MICH. L. REV. 987 (1964); Segal, Search & Seizure in Defense of Drug
Cases, 17 THE PRACTICAL LAWYER No. 5 at 47 (May 1971); Police Perjury:An
Interview with Martin Garbus, 8 CRIM. L. BuLL. 363 (1972).
87. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
88. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 262 La. 475, 263 So. 2d 859, cert. denied, 410
U.S. 944 (1973); State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969), reversed on
other grounds, sub nom., State v. Duplessis, 402 U.S. 946 (1971), on remand 260
La. 644, 257 So. 2d 135 (1971).
89. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703.
90. State v. Hall, 253 La. 425, 218 So. 2d 320 (1960). See also State v.
Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945).
91. State v. Bendo, 381 So. 2d 106 (La. 1973).
92. State v. Wilkerson, 261 La. 342, 259 So. 2d 871 (1972).
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ered included within article 703, whether the review is on
appeal or otherwise.
Justice Dixon, in State v. Watson,93 points out that trial
courts' reluctance to require production of oral statements is
"[p]robably for the reason that the management of a scheme
requiring such production would be difficult and complicated
....

94

Unquestionably the required production of oral state-

ments could present practical problems, but the extension of
the motion to suppress to include oral statements would seem
to provide a viable and reasonable means of making the
statement known so that the defendant can properly address
its admissibility prior to trial. At the hearing on a motion to
suppress, the oral statement would be recounted and transcribed with full courtroom protections for the state and the
defendant. It is suggested that this is a better alternative
than the "pure" discovery mechanism of the recently
amended Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a),9 5 which
requires the government to produce the "substance" of oral
statements. By extending the motion to suppress, the state
only need be required to answer a bill of particulars or otherwise advise that it intends to use an oral statement. The
defense then would have the opportunity to suppress the
statement and, with appropriate safeguards, "discover" its
substance.
In several cases before the court on supervisory writs
prior to trial, 96 the court has indicated that oral statements
would be included within the scope of article 703. Concurring
in the dismissal of a writ of certiorari, Justice Barham has
stated, "The majority of the Court are of the opinion that the
hearing on the motion to suppress an oral confession complies
93. 301 So. 2d 653 (La. 1974).
94. Id. at 655.
95. "Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph: .

.

. the substance of any oral

statement which the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial
made by defendant whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person then known to the defendant to be a government agent
.... " FED. R. CRIM. P. (16)(a) (emphasis added).
96. E.g., State v. Davis, 300 So. 2d 496 (La. 1974), concurrence not found
reported, Docket No. 55-325, October 29, 1974. See also State v. Nelson, 306
So. 2d 745 (La. 1975); State v. Breston, 304 So. 2d 313 (La. 1974); State v.
Jenkins, 302 So. 2d 20 (La. 1974), with only Justices Sanders and Summers
dissenting.
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fully with the intendment of the purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure Article 703 . . .97
The joint concurrence by Justices Barham and Tate in
State v. Watson9" reflects that while the court appears willing
to extend article 703 to oral confessions prior to verdict, it is
less willing to do so on appeal, at least at present: "[W]e are
not of the opinion that a conviction is at this time reversible
in view of reliance upon past jurisprudence and lack of prejudice shown." 99 Probably the court at some future time will
eliminate this distinction and extend article 703 to cover oral
statements, abandoning its present unwillingness to reverse
for failure to consider such statements through the motion to
suppress.
Article 768 notice1 00 developments this term are also significant in determining whether article 703 should apply fully
to oral statements. In State v. Sneed' 0 the state gave notice
that it intended to introduce inculpatory statements, exculpatory statements, or confessions. The defendant objected
that he had not been informed of any oral confession and that
he had not been served with notice of the particular oral
statement. While the court avoided reversal by finding
"harmless error," the well-written opinion by Justice Tate,
tracing the history of the article 768 notice requirement,
stated that the general notice complied with neither the functional intent nor the purpose of article 768. He concluded that
"the state must give sufficient notice of each confession or
inculpatory statement it intends to use, with sufficient specificity as to date or occasion and as to persons to whom given
as to afford adequate notice sufficient to permit the defendant a fair opportunity to meet the issue."10 2 That decision
should result in less reluctance to use the motion to suppress
to determine the admissibility of oral statements.
State v. Leblanc10 3 considered the related problem of the
97. 300 So. 2d at 496.
98. 301 So. 2d 653 (La. 1974).
99. Id. at 657 (emphasis added).
100. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 768 requires: "If the state intends to introduce a confession or inculpatory statement in evidence, it shall so advise the
defendant in writing prior to beginning the state's opening statement. If it
fails to do so a confession or inculpatory statement shall not be admissible in
evidence."
101. 316 So. 2d 372 (La. 1975).
102. Id. at 376.
103. 305 So. 2d 416 (La. 1974).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

determination of whether an oral statement is "inculpatory."
The court defined an inculpatory statement as an "out-ofcourt admission of incriminating facts made by a defendant
after the crime has been committed .... -o104
The application of
this restrictive interpretation presented serious difficulty and
will continue to do so.' 0 5 The language of Miranda v. Arizona
might be helpful in approaching the problem: "No distinction
may be drawn between inculpatory, statements and statements alleged to be 'exculpatory'. If a statement made were in
fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the
prosecutor."0 6
The most significant case this term dealing with pretrial
inspection of physical evidence came from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. While its coming could
hardly be called surprising, 0 7 its impact on existing state
decisions should be significant. In Barnard v. Henderson,'08
the Fifth Circuit effectively reversed the ruling of the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Barnard.0 9 Prior to trial the
defendant had moved to allow his own expert to inspect a
murder weapon and bullet. The trial court denied the motion.
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied relief because there
was no showing under Brady v. Maryland"0 that an independent inspection would have been favorable to the defendant.
The Fifth Circuit cryptically rejected their treatment: "[D]ue
process cannot be sidestepped by such a facile distinction.""'
It noted further, "[F]undamental fairness is violated when a
criminal defendant . . .is denied the opportunity to have an
112
expert of his choosing."
The decision in Barnard is limited to circumstances involving "critical evidence" for which expert testimony is
necessary. The rationale, however, predicated on Brady,
104. Id. at 419.
105. See State v. Wells, 306 So. 2d 695 (La. 1975).
106. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966) (emphasis added).
107. See State v. Breston, 304 So. 2d 313 (La. 1974). "The rulings denying
pre-trial discovery are technically correct under existing jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the requirements of fair trial and of federal due process rulings are
harbingers of change that conscientious prosecutors might well note." Id. at
317 (Tate, J., concurring).
108. 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975).
109. 287 So. 2d 770 (La. 1973).
110. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
111. 514 F.2d at 746.
112. Id. at 746 (emphasis added).
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suggests that the defendant, at least in expert witness circumstances, must be afforded the opportunity to develop
favorable evidence. That rationale seems consistent with
State v. Woodruff, 113 in which the court held that it was error
to deny information about a weapon found on the victim when
a defendant asserted a claim of self-defense. But in State v.
Collins,1 4 a unanimous opinion, the court reiterated its position that Woodruff was limited to self-defense claims.
An expansion of the Brady rationale may have significant
impact with respect to confessions, admissions and pretrial
discovery generally." 5 In State v. Swendsen" 6 the court, after
granting supervisory writs, dismissed the writ after state
compliance with a request to produce physical evidence. Justice Barham in a concurrence to the dismissal noted, "[T]his
court intended to expand the rule in State v. Migliore .... I
am of the belief that a majority of this court are now of the
opinion that pre-trial production of physical evidence for
7
examination . . . is required.""
The concurrence contemplates only those types of evidence which require expert evaluation and does not suggest
that all physical evidence is subject to inspection, indicating
no present intent to go beyond the Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Barnard. It might be difficult, however, to find any physical
evidence to be introduced at trial that might not be subject to
expert evaluation.
In State v. Boothe 18 the court was confronted with
another Brady-related problem. In response to a bill of particulars the state responded that it had no confession, admission or other adverse statement made by the defendant. Immediately prior to the bench trial, it gave a gratuitous 768
notice. 1 9 The court determined that the trial court erred in
allowing the oral statement to be admitted after the state
negligently advised the defendant that no statement was
available. Significantly, the court avoided the question of
whether the bill of particulars was a proper means of discovering the existence of an oral statement, basing its decision
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

281 So. 2d 95 (La. 1973).
308 So. 2d 263 (La. 1975).
But see State v. Williams, 310 So. 2d 528 (La. 1975).
316 So. 2d 394 (La. 1975).
Id. at 395.
310 So. 2d 826 (La. 1975).
State v. Clearly, 262 La. 539, 263 So. 2d 882 (1972).
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on principles of fundamental fairness.' 20 It rejected the
state's contention that the error had been waived by defendant's failure to request a continuance to adjust his trial
tactics on the grounds that to do so would encourage willful
or negligent pretrial dealings with the defendant.
While under present case law the defendant's right to
discover the existence of oral statements is questionable, if
the state does respond that no such statements exist, it is
bound by its response. This strict due process rule could have
the ironic effect of discouraging prosecutors from giving such
information at all. Of course, if oral statements were handled
through the bill of particulars and motion to suppress procedures suggested, the problem of negligence would not be
eliminated. If the state must disclose the existence of an oral
statement through a bill of particulars, it is suggested that in
cases of good faith prosecutor error a continuance should be
available or required upon request. Since the bill of particulars amplifies the bill of information,'121 it should be treated as
an amendment and a right of continuance should accrue
under article 489. Official Comment (A) states, "The purpose
of the continuance ... is to protect the defendant from surprise and prejudice which may result from amendment of the
' 22
indictment or bill of particulars.'
In light of the fundamental fairness due process considerations, strict adherence to
the formalistic written and verified motion for the continuance' 23 should be relaxed, especially when the negligence
24
of the prosecution creates the grounds for continuance.'
CONFESSIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Several cases this term aid in clarifying the burden of
proof standard for determining voluntariness of confessions
pursuant to Louisiana R.S. 15:451, 15:452 and Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure article 703(C). In State v. Monroe,' 25 the
defendant and several witnesses testified to physical abuse,
prolonged questioning and promises, of immunity prior to the
defendant's confession. The six police officers who testified
stated that no improper conduct took place in their presence.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

310 So. 2d at 830.
State v. Hayman, 256 La. 18, 235 So. 2d 78 (1970).
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 489, comment (a).
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 707.
See Flanagan v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1974).
305 So. 2d 902 (La. 1974).

1976] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1974-1975

599

Significantly, the accused and his witnesses testified that the
coercive police conduct took place outside the presence of the
six testifying officers. The state offered no rebuttal testimony. The court reversed, in light of the stringent burden of
proof on the state, 126 noting, "[T]he state is required to rebut
specific testimony introduced on behalf of the defendant concerning factual circumstances which indicate coercive mea1 27
sures or intimidation.'
Subsequently, in State v. Sims, 12 8 police officers' testimony on direct examination appeared to directly contradict
defendant's testimony. The state did not recall the officers to
testify on rebuttal. The court found that the state had met its
burden of proof, stating that "it would be superfluous to require the officers to take the stand to repeat what they testified to in the state's affirmative showing."' 129 The court distinguished Monroe because in Sims state witnesses "specifically testified on direct examination that there was no
force or violence used."'130 In suggesting that "only when the
defendant presents evidence which is not directly contradicted by the officer's original testimony is the state required to present evidence to rebut the defendant's evidence,"'13 the court correctly rejected a ritualistic "last to
testify" rule.
State v. Peters 32 also involved a situation in which the
police testified that they did not physically abuse the defendant. The defendant testified that the police did abuse him by
breaking a tooth, which he displayed, and bruising his lip.
Other defense witnesses testified that the lip and tooth were
not injured prior to arrest. The court found that the state
failed to meet its burden of proof by not rebutting the defendant's evidence of physical injury. It indicated that the failure resulted "because . . . [the state] failed to rebut specifically the testimony of defendant's witnesses when it presumably could have."' 33 It further indicated that the burden
126. Part of that burden of proof is that "the State is obliged to call its
witnesses first and to go forward with its proof at the hearing on the motion
to suppress." State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678, 683 (La. 1974).
127. State v. Monroe, 305 So. 2d 902, 912 (La. 1974).
128. 310 So. 2d 587 (La. 1975).
129. Id. at 589.
130. Id. at 590.
131. Id. at 590.
132. 315 So. 2d 678 (La. 1975).
133. Id. at 683 (emphasis added).
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was upon the state not only to contradict the specific claim of
physical injury evidenced by objective symptoms but in addi1 34
tion to "explain how he incurred his injuries.'
While these cases, as well as earlier cases, are closely wed
to their unique facts and lack universally applicable standards, they contain several general guidelines. It is helpful to
distinguish cases in which additional testimony from persons
already testifying is needed from cases in which additional
witnesses are needed. When the state adduces general testimony regarding the absence of wrongdoing and the defense
offers detailed testimony of specific wrongdoing, the state
must adduce specific rebuttal testimony. 135 If the evidence
produced by the defendant is not within the scope of knowledge of state witnesses who have previously testified, the
state must produce additional witnesses. 36 When the state
has witnesses who are alleged to be involved in the wrongdoing or who witnessed it and they are available, the state has a
duty to produce the additional witnesses to meet its burden of
proof. 1 37 If the defense does not present evidence going beyond that produced by the state in terms of scope or specificity, the state need not recall its witnesses to take the stand
on rebuttal. 3 Undoubtedly other situations may arise. The
requirement of rebuttal testimony should not become ritualistic; neither, however, should the requirement of proof
of voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt become less than
a most stringent standard.
ARGERSINGER-RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
State v. Coody' 39 set the stage for dealing with the retroactive application of Argersingerv. Hamlin 40 by announc134. Id. at 682.
135. See, e.g., State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678 (La. 1975) (where there is
specific testimony of physical injury the court may well require an explanation of how the defendant was injured or at least specific rebuttal of when the
injury took place); State v. Simien, 248 La. 323, 178 So. 2d 266 (1965); State v.
Robinson, 215 La. 974, 41 So. 2d 898 (1949).
136. See State v. Monroe, 305 So. 2d 902 (La. 1974); State v. Honeycutt,
216 La. 610, 44 So. 2d 313 (1950).
137. See State v. Honeycutt, 216 La. 610, 44 So. 2d 313 (1950).
138. See State v. Sims, 310 So. 2d 590 (La. 1975).
139. 275 So. 2d 773 (La. 1973).
140. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
141. "The minutes of the court must show either that the defendant was
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ing that the Code of Criminal Procedure1 41 requires that court
minutes affirmatively reflect presence of counsel or waiver.
City of Monroe v. Coleman' 42 affirmed this strict application.
In both cases the court strictly applied the affirmative record
requirement without reference to the question of defendant's
43
indigency at the time of the conviction. In State v. Guillotte'
the court held, prior to the United States Supreme Court's
similar decision in Berry v. City of Cincinnati,'" that Argersinger applied retroactively and applied its rule to a prior
uncounseled conviction resulting in imprisonment. The court
thus prohibited the use of a prior DWI conviction resulting in
imprisonment to enhance a pending charge.
The most troublesome question was whether Argersinger
applied retroactively to convictions that did not result in imprisonment. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the
somewhat strained rationale of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Cottle v. Wainwright, 45 which
held that Argersinger applied retroactively to convictions for
which persons were incarcerated, and thus prevented references to those convictions, but did not apply retroactively to
convictions for which persons were not incarcerated. In City
of Monroe v. Fincher 46 the court held that the prior uncounseled DWI convictions could not be used to subject an accused
to prosecution as a repeat DWI offender regardless of
whether the prior conviction resulted in imprisonment.
While Argersinger does not appear to mandate such a
result, 14 7 the decision in Fincher is sound in avoiding the
anomalous result of Cottle. Moreover, Fincher accords with
Article 1, § 13 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, extending
the right to counsel to crimes punishable by imprisonment. It
thus avoids the necessity of distinguishing Argersinger applications prior to the new constitution and subsequent.
represented by counsel or that he was informed by the court of the defendant's right to court-appointed counsel." LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 514.
142. 304 So. 2d 332 (La. 1974).
143. 297 So. 2d 423 (La. 1974).
144. 414 U.S. 29 (1973).
145. 477 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1973), remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 895'
(1973).
146. 305 So. 2d 108 (La. 1974). See also State v. Strange, 308 So. 2d 795
(La. 1975).
147. See City of Monroe v. Fincher, 305 So. 2d 108, 111 (La. 1974) (Sanders, C. J., dissenting).
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT INTERROGATION

In light of the continuing increase in size of the Louisiana
bar, the seemingly greater geographical mobility of defense
counsel in the state, and the often necessary practice of
lawyers giving instructions over the telephone, State v.
Jackson'4 is a significant case. Defendant was arrested for
kidnapping. Two days later, defense counsel who, unknown to
defendant, had been retained by her parents to represent her,
called from New Orleans to Vidalia, the place of detention.
Unable to reach the district attorney's office, he called the
sheriff's office, identified himself, informed them that he had
been retained to represent the defendant, and requested that
she not be subjected to further interrogation until he could
confer with her within twenty-four hours. About thirty minutes later deputies began interrogating the defendant after
giving her the Miranda warnings. She was asked a series of
specific questions regarding whether she had counsel or had
heard of the caller. After answering negatively to each of the
questions, the interrogation continued, resulting in an inculpatory statement.
The trial court apparently allowed the statement to be
admitted because the defense counsel had not been enrolled
as counsel and thus could not be considered to be representing the prisoner. The supreme court correctly dismissed this
contention outright. There is no provision or mechanism for
"enrolling" as counsel at such early stages of a prosecution.
Such a mechanistic approach is wholly unrealistic and would
probably be constitutionally infirm. 149 The more difficult
questions relate to the duty the police owed to defendant and
defense counsel under such circumstances to withhold interrogation. Implicit in this question is a determination of the
effect of the preliminary questions regarding the existence of
counsel addressed to the defendant and her responses.
The court clearly imposed a duty upon the sheriff, and
perhaps the district attorney,1 50 to check the information
given by telephone by defense counsel and cease interrogation until the representation could be verified.' 5 ' However,
148. 303 So. 2d 734 (La. 1974).
149. Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
150. "The sheriff and the district attorney felt that they were under no
duty . . . ." 303 So. 2d at 736.

151. "One cannot avoid the prisoner's constitutional right to advice of
counsel retained by [for] her by totally ignoring his [the lawyer's] claims of
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the deputies did not "totally ignore" the attorney's claim of
representation, but rather went through a long dialogue with
defendant with respect to the claim. The fatal error appears
to be the officers' failure to affirmatively advise the defendant of the claimed representation in order to effect an informed waiver of her right to counsel. The opinion indicates
that for an informed waiver, the defendant should have been
advised of the nature of the telephone call and the request of
her purported counsel that she not be interrogated until after
he could confer with her.
The opinion goes further in indicating a much more stringent requirement that once the lawyer requests that the
police cease interrogation, the state may not "ignore his [the
lawyer's] request that he be allowed to confer with his client
prior to, if not during, the interrogation. ' 152 If defendant had
been advised of the nature of the telephone call and had then
"consented" to the interrogation despite the lawyer's request,
would the statements be admissible? The court's language
makes admissibility suspect even in those circumstances.
While it does not appear that the court resolved this question,
the ABA standards suggest that "no waiver should be accepted unless [the defendant] has at least once conferred with
1 53
a lawyer."'
CHARGING CRIMES
In State v. James,'54 the indictment charged that the defendant ".... while armed with a dangerous weapon... robbed
the Pioneer Natural Gas Company .... ." Under prior jurisprudence the indictment was defective because armed robbery is a crime committed against a person, not a building or
corporation.155 The prior decisions had held that even when
no objection had been made, the court on its own motion was
required to dismiss since the prosecution was founded on a
defective indictment. In a well-written opinion explaining the
historical origin of strict charging rules and their partial inrepresentation until after such a time as the interrogation has been completed." Id. at 737.
152. Id.
153. ABA STANDARDS, Providing Defense Services § 7.3 (1968).
154. 305 So. 2d 514 (La. 1974).
155. State v. Williams, 275 So. 2d 738 (La. 1973); State v. Smith, 275 So. 2d
733 (La. 1973).
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applicability today, 156 James reverses prior cases to the extent that they permitted post-verdict questioning of the indictment even though there was actual notice of the offense
charged and no actual prejudice. The decision does not
change prior rulings as they affect pre-trial and trial remedies available to a defendant charged in a defective indict157
ment.
The court correctly noted that the position it took was
analogous to that of the federal courts. In light of the existence of the considerable federal experience and jurisprudence, 5 8 the development of state standards for determining
whether there is "actual notice" or "no actual prejudice" in
post-verdict challenges should not prove difficult.
156. This inapplicability today is based primarily on the presence of full
records as now required by LA. CONST. art. I, § 19. See also State v.
Michelli, 301 So. 2d 577 (La. 1974).
157. "Thus, if the defective indictment is questioned prior to or during
trial and if correction is refused, we do not mean that such error may not be
urged upon appeal in the same manner as in the past." 305 So. 2d at 518.
158. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)-(b); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 123 (3d ed. 1969).

